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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO ACTION 
APPELLANTS 
Mast Construction Company ("Mast Construction"): Defen-
dant below in C-85-1607, C-85-3067, C-85-4885. Mast Construction 
was substituted for Debenham Electric Supply Co. on December 16, 
1986. R-III-1179 to -1185. 
Ron Mast: Ron Mast was substituted for Intermountain 
Glass and Paint Co. and Marathon Steel Co. on December 16, 1986. 
Id. 
RESPONDENT 
American Savings & Loan Association ("American"): 
Plaintiff below in C-85-4885. 
OTHER ACTIVE PARTIES AT TRIAL 
Electro Technical Corporation ("Electro Tech"): Defen-
dant below in C-85-1607 and C-85-4885. Electro Tech did not 
appeal. 
Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc. ("Edwards & 
Daniels"): Defendant below in C-85-4885. Edwards & Daniels filed 
Notice of Appeal on December 16, 1986. That appeal, No. 860669, 
was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Utah on June 8, 1987 due to 
Edwards & Daniels1 failure to prosecute the appeal. 
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TABLE OF CITATIONS AND AUTHORITIES 
RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT: 
Consideration governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only 
when there are special and important reasons therefor. The 
following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring 
the courtfs discretion, indicate the character of reasons 
that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision in conflict with a decision of another 
panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of 
law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state or federal law in a way that is 
in conflict with a decision of this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision that has so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings 
or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a 
lower court as to call for an exercise of this 
court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state or federal law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by this 
court, 
RULE 33(a) OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT: 
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of 
attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the 
court shall determine that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or 
double costs, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, to the prevailing party. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MAST HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY REASON UNDER 
RULE 43 FOR THIS COURT TO EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY 
REVIEW OVER THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court lists 
four reasons that illustrate the circumstances under which the 
Supreme Court will consider reviewing a decision of the Court of 
Appeals. The petitioners (collectively "Mast") have not even 
attempted to demonstrate how the questions it presented merit 
review under Rule 43 criteria. Mast's petition seems to assume 
that review by the Supreme Court is a matter of right, not one of 
discretion. Because Mast has failed to demonstrate (or even 
offer) any reason for this Court to grant certiorari, this Peti-
tion should be denied. 
A* Question No. 1 - Was the Trust Deed Effective as a 
Mortgage? 
Mast first requests this court to review the Court of 
Appeals1 unanimous ruling that American's trust deed was effec-
tive as a mortgage. As stated above, Mast does not suggest which 
of the Rule 43 factors might apply to this issue. For this rea-
son alone, certiorari should be denied on Question No. 1. 
Even if the Court indulges in speculation as to which 
of the four factors might have been offered in support of the 
Petition, it will find that none of them applies. The first two 
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factors (conflict with another panel of the Court of Appeals and 
conflict with the decision of this Court) can be ruled out 
because Mast cites no conflicting decisions. Indeed, none 
exists. The third factor can be ruled out because there is no 
suggestion in Mast's petition that the Court of Appeals departed 
in any respect from the "accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings" or that it sanctioned such a departure by the trial 
court. 
That leaves the fourth factor, an issue that presents 
an important question of municipal, state or federal law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. The issue 
here is whether an inadvertent omission of the loan amount and 
the name of the trustee precludes a trust deed from operating as 
a mortgage. Mast's Petition does nothing to dispel the 
impression that this is a very unimportant and pedestrian ques-
tion of law that hardly needs to be settled by this Court. The 
Court of Appeals had little difficulty in ruling in American's 
favor, since Mast never offered a sensible theory explaining why 
no mortgage existed, much less any legal authority to back up the 
theory. Mast has demonstrated no reason for this Court to 
disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals. 
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B, Question Nos. 2 and 3 - Whether the Trust Deed Was 
Executed in the Presence of the Notary 
In yet another attempt to reargue the evidence pre-
sented to the trial court, Mast's second and third questions 
would require this Court to re-examine the trial court's finding 
of fact that the trust deed was executed in the presence of the 
notary. Mast claims the trial court's finding was "against the 
great weight of the evidence." A request to overturn a finding 
because it is "against the great weight of the evidence" totally 
ignores the requirement that special and important reasons exist 
before the Court will exercise its discretion to review a lower 
court decision. Once again Mast fails even to suggest which of 
the factors under Rule 43 justify its request for discretionary 
review. 
The Court of Appeals aptly characterized Mast's posi-
tion as: "overlook[ing] the specific finding of the trial court 
that the instrument was signed in the notary's presence, choosing 
instead to reargue the contradictory testimony on this point..." 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., Utah Adv. Report 
53, 55 (Ct. App. December 15, 1988). The Court of Appeals had 
little trouble finding that Mast failed to carry its burden in 
challenging the trial court's finding of fact. 
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There was simply no credible evidence introduced at 
trial to impeach the notary's certification that the trust deed 
was executed in his presence. According to Mast's own recitation 
of facts (Mast's Petition at 8-9) three witnesses testified that 
the two signatories and the notary were present in the room 
together where the document was executed. Although one of the 
signatories testified at trial that he signed the document some-
where else, he had given different versions in an earlier deposi-
tion and an earlier affidavit, which prompted the trial court to 
observe: 
"Mr. Akerlow says he signed a lot of places. I 
will be very frank with you, gentlemen, I just 
didn't believe Mr. Akerlow. That's why I found 
the issues the way I did. He changed his mind too 
often. I don't think he really knew." 
Transcript - IV - 1649-1650. 
Thus, the trial court's finding was not against, but 
was in conformity with the weight of the evidence. In any 
case, there is simply no showing that the trial court (or 
the Court of Appeals) departed from the "accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings", and thus no showing that 
this Court should review the case. 
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II. UNDER RULE 33 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, 
AMERICAN IS ENTITLED TO IT ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
IN OPPOSING THIS PETITION. 
The fact that Mast has not even attempted to qualify 
the questions presented for or review under the factors listed in 
Rule 43 leads to the inevitable conclusion that it filed this 
Petition frivolously or for purposes of delay. Under Rule 33, 
American requests an award of its costs doubled and its attor-
neys' fee in opposing this Petition. 
DATED this _1 day of March, 1989. 
W. Cullen Battle 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
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